We consider profit-maximization problems for combinatorial auctions with non-single minded valuation functions and limited supply. There are n customers and m items, each of which is available is in some limited supply or capacity. Each customer j has a value v j (S) for each subset S of items specifying the maximum amount she is willing to pay for that set (with v j (∅) = 0). A feasible solution to the profitmaximization problem consists of item prices and an allocation (S 1 , . . . , S n ) of items to customers such that (i) the price of the set S j assigned to j is at most v j (S j ), and (ii) the number of customers who are allotted an item is at most its capacity. The goal is find a feasible solution that maximizes the total profit earned by selling items to customers.
Introduction
Profit (or revenue) maximization is a classic and fundamental economic goal, and the design of computationallyefficient item-pricing schemes for various profit-maximization problems has received much recent attention [1, 20, 4, 2, 5, 3] . We study the algorithmic problem of item-pricing for profit-maximization for general
Theorem 1.1 (Informal statement). (i) For the class of subadditive (and hence submodular) valuations, one can obtain a solution with profit OPT SWM /O(log c max ).
(ii) Given any class of valuations for which the corresponding SWM problem admits a packing-type LP relaxation with an integrality gap of α as "verified" by an α-approximation algorithm, one can obtain a solution with profit OPT SWM /O(α log c max ).
(Part (ii) above does not imply part (i), because for part (ii) we require an integrality-gap guarantee which, roughly speaking, means that we require an algorithm that returns a "good" solution for every profile of n valuations.)
A key notable aspect of our theorem is its versatility. One can simply "plug in" various known (or easily derivable) results about the SWM problem to obtain approximation algorithms for various limitedsupply profit-maximization problems. For example, as corollaries of part (ii) of our theorem, we obtain an O( √ m log c max )-approximation for profit-maximization for combinatorial auctions with arbitrary valuations, and an O(log c max )-approximation for the non-single-minded tollbooth problem on trees (see Section 3.1). The first result follows from the various known O( √ m)-approximation algorithms for the SWM problem for CAs with arbitrary valuations that also bound the integrality gap [26, 23] . For the second result, we devise a suitable O(1)-approximation for the SWM problem corresponding to non-single-minded tollbooth on trees, by adapting the randomized-rounding approach of Chakrabarty et al. [9] .
Notice that with bundle-pricing, which is often used in the context of mechanism design for CAs, the profit-maximization problem becomes equivalent to the SWM problem. Thus, our results provide worstcase bounds on how item-pricing (which may be viewed as a fairness constraint on the seller) diminishes the revenue of the seller versus bundle-pricing. It is also worth remarking that our algorithms for an arbitrary valuation class (i.e., part (ii) above) can be modified in a simple way to return prices and an allocation (S 1 , . . . , S n ) with the following ǫ-"one-sided envy-freeness" property while diminishing the profit by a (1 − ǫ)-factor: for every non-empty S j , the utility that j obtains from S j is at least ǫ times the maximum utility j may obtain from any set (see Remark 3.7).
The only previous guarantees for limited-supply CAs with a general valuation-class are those obtained via a reduction in [2] , showing that an α-approximation for the SWM problem and an algorithm for the unlimited-supply SM problem that returns profit at least OPT SWM /β yield an αβ-approximation. A simple "grouping-by-density" approach gives β = O(log m+log n); using the best known bound on β [5] yields an O α(log m + log c max ) guarantee, which is significantly weaker than our guarantees. (E.g., we obtain an O(α)-approximation for constant c max .) The O(log c max )-factor we incur is unavoidable if one compares the profit against the optimal social welfare: a well-known example with one item, n = c max players shows a gap of H cmax := 1 + 1 2 + · · · + 1 cmax between the optima of the SWM-and profit-maximization problems. Almost all results for profit-maximization for CAs with non-SM valuations also compare against the optimum social welfare, so they also incur this factor. Also, it is easy to see that with c max = 1, the profitmaximization problem reduces to the SWM problem, so an inapproximability result for the SWM problem also yields an inapproximability result for our problem. Thus, we obtain an m 1 2 -, or n-, inapproximability for CAs with even SM valuations (see, e.g., [19] ), and APX-hardness for CAs with subadditive, submodular valuations, and the tollbooth problem on trees.
The proof of Theorem 1.1 is based on considering a natural LP-relaxation (P) for the SWM problem and its dual. A crucial observation is that an optimal primal solution combined with the optimal values of the dual variables corresponding to the primal supply constraints can be seen as furnishing a "feasible" solution with a fractional allocation to (even) the (envy-free) profit-maximization problem. [12] utilized this observation to design an approximation algorithm for the single-minded envy-free profit-maximization problem. But even with unit capacities and one non-single-minded customer, there is an Ω(m)-factor gap between the optimum (integer or fractional) social-welfare and the optimum profit achievable by an envyfree pricing (see, e.g., [3] ). Our approach is similar to the one in [12] , but as suggested by the above fact, we need new ingredients to exploit the greater flexibility afforded by the profit-maximization problem (vs. the envy-free problem) and turn the above observation into an approximation algorithm even for non-singleminded valuations. As in [12] , we argue that there must be an optimal dual solution with suitable, possibly lowered, item-capacities yielding profit (with the fractional allocation) comparable to OPT SWM . A suitable rounding of the optimal primal solution with these capacities then yields a good allocation, which combined with the prices obtained yields the desired approximation bounds. Here, for part (ii) of Theorem 1.1, we leverage a decomposition technique of [8] . Thus, our work shows that (in contrast to the envy-free setting) for profit-maximization problems, one can obtain a great deal of mileage from the LP-relaxation of the SWM problem and exploit LP-based techniques to obtain guarantees even for various non-single-minded valuation classes.
In Section 4, we consider an alternate approach for the non-SM highway problem that (does not use OPT SWM as an upper bound and) achieves an (incomparable) O(log m)-approximation factor. We decompose the instance via an exponential-size configuration LP, which is solved approximately using the ellipsoid method and rounded via randomized rounding. Here, we use LP duality to handle dependencies arising from the non-SM setting.
Theorem 1.2. There is an O(log m)-approximation algorithm for the non-single-minded highway problem with (i) subadditive valuations with limited supply; and (ii) arbitrary valuations with unlimited supply.
It is worth noting that the non-SM highway problem with subadditive valuations can be used to capture some multi-product pricing problems in the so-called Max-Buy model (a customer buys the most expensive product she can afford), with or without a price ladder, considered by Aggarwal et al. [1] . (Indeed, the case without a ladder (resp., with a ladder) can be modeled by a set of disjoint intervals (resp., a Laminar set of intervals sharing the right end-point), where customers' valuations are defined on each of these intervals). In fact, our algorithm in Theorem 1.2 is based on combining ideas from the PTAS for the version with a price ladder in [1] , and the e e−1 -approximation algorithm for the one without a ladder. We observe that our method gives the following result 1 for the multi-product pricing problem, which improves on the 2-approximation result in [6] . Related work. There has been a great deal of recent work on approximation algorithms for various kinds of pricing problems; see, e.g., [1, 3, 12, 10, 20, 6, 18, 15] , and the references therein. However, to our knowledge, the only approximation results for profit-maximization for non-single-minded CAs with (general) limited supply (i.e., not necessarily unit-or unlimited-supply) are: (1) those gleaned from the reduction in [2] coupled with the guarantee in [5] ; and (2) the 2-approximation algorithm of [6] for unit-demand valuations (where each customer wants at most one item). (For this very structured subclass of submodular valuations, this 2-approximation result is better than the guarantee we obtain using Theorem 1.1; hopwever, our method .) We briefly survey the work in three special cases that have been studied: unit supply, unlimited supply, and single-minded (SM) valuations.
As remarked earlier, with unit capacities, the profit-maximization problem reduces to the SWM problem, which is a relatively well-studied problem. The approximation guarantees known for the SWM problem for CAs with unit capacities are (i) 2 for subadditive valuations [16] ; (ii) e e−1 [14, 28] for submodular valuations; and (iii) Θ( √ m) for arbitrary valuations [26, 23] . Recently, Balcan et al. [3] and Chakraborty et al. [10] considered the unit-capacity problem with subadditive valuations in the online setting where customers arrive online and select their utility-maximizing set from the unallotted items given the current prices. The guarantees they obtain in this constrained setting are naturally worse than the guarantees known in the offline setting. The unlimited-supply setting with arbitrary valuations has been less studied; [3] gave an O(log m + log n)-approximation algorithm by extending an algorithm in [20] for SM valuations. The single-minded profit-maximization problem has received much attention. The work that is most relevant to ours is Cheung and Swamy [12] , who obtain an approximation guarantee of the same flavor as in part (ii) of Theorem 1.1. They obtain an envy-free solution of profit OPT SWM /O(α log c max ) using an LP-based α-approximation for the SWM problem (in the SM setting, this is equivalent to the integrality-gap requirement we have); we make use of portions of their analysis in proving our results. For the unlimitedsupply SM problem, [20] gave an O(log m + log n)-approximation guarantee, which was improved by Briest and Krysta [5] . A variety of approximation results based on dynamic programming have been obtained [20, 21, 4, 5, 19 ] that yield exact algorithms or approximation schemes for various restricted instances, or pseudopolynomial or quasipolynomial time algorithms. On the hardness side, a reduction from the setpacking problem shows that achieving an approximation factor better than m 1 2 , or n, is NP-hard even when c max = 1, even for the (SM) tollbooth problem on grid graphs [19] , and [13, 5, 20, 11] prove various hardness results for unlimited-supply instances.
Finally, we note that the singe-minded version of the highway problem admits a PTAS in the unlimited supply case [18] and a quasi-PTAS for the limited supply case [15] (with an ǫ-approximate notion of envyfreeness), while the non-single minded version is APX-hard (since it includes the multi-product pricing problem which was proved to be APX-hard in the Max-Buying setting in [1] ).
Problem definition and preliminaries
Profit-maximization problems for combinatorial auctions. The general setup of profit-maximization problems for (multi unit) combinatorial auctions (CAs) is as follows. There are n customers and m items. Let [n] := {1, . . . , n} and [m] := {1, . . . , m}. Each item e is available in some limited supply or capacity c e . Each customer j has a valuation function v j : 2 [m] → R + , where v j (S) specifies the maximum amount that customer j is willing to pay for the set S; equivalently this is j's value for receiving the set S of items. We assume that v j (∅) = 0; we often assume for convenience that v j (S) ≤ v j (T ) for S ⊆ T , but this monotonicity requirement is not crucial for our results. The objective is to find non-negative prices p e ≥ 0 for the items, and an allocation (S 1 , . . . , S n ) of items to customers (where S j could be empty) so as to maximize the total profit j∈[n] e∈S j p e = e∈[m] p e |{j : e ∈ S j }| while satisfying the following two constraints.
• Budget constraints. Each customer j can afford to buy her assigned set: p S j := e∈S j p e ≤ v j S j .
• Capacity constraints. Each element e is assigned to at most c e customers: |{j ∈ [n] : e ∈ S j }| ≤ c e .
Since the valuations may be arbitrary set functions, an explicit description of the input may require exponential (in m) space. Hence, we assume that the valuations are specified via an oracle. As is standard in the literature on combinatorial auctions and profit-maximization problems (see, e.g., [24, 16, 3, 10] ), we assume that a valuation v is specified by a demand oracle, which means that given item prices {p e }, the demand-oracle returns a set S that maximizes the utility v(S) − p(S). We use c max := max e c e to denote the maximum item supply.
An LP relaxation. We consider a natural linear programming (LP) relaxation (P) of the SWM problem for combinatorial auctions, and its dual (D). Throughout, we use j to index customers, e to index items, and S to index sets of items. We use the terms supply and capacity, and customer and player interchangeably.
In the primal LP, we have a variable x j,S for each customer j and set S that indicates if j receives set S, and we relax the integrality constraints on these variables to obtain the LP relaxation. The dual (D) has variables z j and y e for each customer j and element e respectively, which correspond to the primal constraints (1) and (2) respectively. Although (D) has an exponential number of constraints, it can be solved efficiently given demand oracles for the valuations as these oracles yield the desired separation oracle for (D). This in turn implies that (P) can be solved efficiently. We say that an algorithm A for the SWM problem is an LP-based α-approximation algorithm for a class V of valuations if for every instance involving valuation functions (v 1 , . . . , v n ), where each v j ∈ V, A returns an integer solution of value at least LP-optimum/α. For example, the algorithm in [16] is an LP-based 2-approximation algorithm for the class of subadditive valuations.
Definition 2.1. We say that an algorithm A for the SWM problem "verifies" an integrality gap of (at most) α for an LP-relaxation of the SWM problem (e.g.,(P)), if for every profile of (monotonic) valuation functions
As emphasized above, an integrality-gap-verifying algorithm above must "work" for every valuationprofile. (Note that for the SWM problem, one can always assume that the valuation is monotonic, since we can always move from a set to its subset (as items may be left unallotted).) In particular, an LP-based α-approximation algorithm for a given structured class of valuations (e.g., submodular or subadditive valuations) does not verify the integrality gap for the LP-relaxation. This is the precise reason why our guarantee for subadditive valuations (part (i) of Theorem 1.1) does not follow from part (ii) of Theorem 1.1. In certain cases however, one may be able to encapsulate the combinatorial structure of the SWM problem with a structured valuation class by formulating a stronger LP-relaxation for the SWM problem, and thereby prove that an approximation algorithm for the structured valuation class is in fact an integrality-gap-verifying approximation algorithm with respect to this stronger LP-relaxation. For example, in Section 3.1 we consider the setting where items are edges of a tree and customers desire paths of the tree. This leads to the structured valuation where, for a set of edges T , v(T ) = max{v(P ) : P is a path in T } (with v(P ) ≥ 0 being the value for path P ). We design an O(1)-approximation algorithm for such valuations, and formulate a stronger LP for the corresponding SWM problem for which our algorithm verifies a constant integrality gap. (For the SWM problem with subadditive valuations, it is not known how to exploit the underlying structure and formulate an efficiently-solvable LP-relaxation with O(1) integrality gap.)
For a given instance I = m, n, {v j } j∈[n] , {c(e)} e∈[m] , our algorithms will consider different capacity vectors k ≤ c. We use (P k ) and (D k ) to denote respectively (P) and (D) with capacity-vector k = (k e ), and OPT(k) to denote their common optimal value. Let OPT := OPT(c) denote the optimum value of (P) (and (D)) with the original capacities. We will utilize the following facts that follow from complementary slackness, and a rounding result that follows from the work of Carr and Vempala [8] , and was made explicit in [24] . Claim 2.2. Let k = (k e ) be any capacity-vector, and let x * and (y * , z * ) be optimal solutions to (P k ) and
Proof. Parts (i) and (iii) follow directly from the complementary slackness (CS) conditions: part (i) follows from the CS condition for x * j,S , since z * i ≥ 0; part (iii) uses the CS condition for y * e and the corresponding primal constraint (2). For part (ii), again, by the CS conditions we have e∈S y * e + z * j = v j (S). Also, dual feasibility implies that e∈S\T y * e + z * j ≥ v j (S \ T ). Subtracting this from the first equation and using subadditivity yields e∈T 
Remark 2.3. As mentioned above, we will sometimes consider a different LP-relaxation when considering the SWM problem with a structured class of valuations. Roughly speaking, the only properties we require of this LP are that it should: (a) include a constraint similar to (2) that encodes the supply constraints; and (b) be a packing LP, i.e., have the form Ax ≤ b, x ≥ 0 where A is a nonnegative matrix. Given this, parts (i) and (iii) of Claim 2.2 continue to hold with y e denoting (as before) the dual variable corresponding to the supply constraint for item e, since the dual is then a covering LP.
Lemma 2.4 ([8, 24]). Given a fractional solution x to the LP-relaxation of an SWM problem that is a packing LP (e.g., (P k )), and a polytime integrality-gap-verifying α-approximation algorithm A for this LP, one can express
x α as a convex combination of integer solutions to the LP in polytime. In particular, one can round x to a random integer solutionx satisfying the following "rounding property":
The main algorithm and its applications
Claim 2.2 leads to the simple, but important observation that if k ≤ c and the optimal primal solution x * is integral, then by using {y * e } as the prices, one obtains a feasible solution to the profit-maximization problem with profit e k e y * e . There are two main obstacles encountered in leveraging this observation and turning it into an approximation algorithm. First, (P k ) will of course not in general have an integral optimal solution. Second, it is not clear what capacity-vector k ≤ c to use: for instance, e c e y * e could be much smaller than OPT (it is easy to construct such examples), and in general, e k e y * e could be quite small for a given capacity-vector k ≤ c. We overcome these difficulties by taking an approach similar to the one in [12] .
We tackle the second difficulty by utilizing a key lemma proved by Cheung and Swamy [12] , which is stated in a slightly more general form in Lemma 3.2 so that it can be readily applied to various profitmaximization problems. This lemma implies that one can efficiently compute a capacity-vector k ≤ c and an optimal dual solution (y * , z * ) to (D k ) such that e k e y * e is OPT − OPT(1) /O(log c max ), where 1 denotes the all-one's vector (Corollary 3.4). To handle the first difficulty, notice that part (i) of Claim 2.2 implies that one can still use {y * e } as the prices, provided we obtain an allocation (i.e., integer solution)x that only assigns a set S to customer j (i.e.,x j,S = 1) if x * j,S > 0. (In contrast, in the envy-free setting, if we use {y * e } as the prices then every customer j with z * j > 0, and hence S x * j,S = 1, must be assigned a set S with x * j,S > 0; this may be impossible with non-single-minded valuations, whereas this is easy to accomplish with single-minded valuations (as there is only one set per customer).) Furthermore, for subadditive valuations, part (ii) of Claim 2.2 shows that it suffices to obtain an allocation wherex j,T = 1 implies that there is some set S ⊇ T with x * j,S > 0. This is precisely what our algorithms do. We show that one can round x * into an integer solutionx satisfying the above structural properties, and in addition ensure that the profit obtained, j,Tx j,T e∈T y * e , is "close" to e k e y * e (Lemma 3.5). So if e k e y * e is OPT/O(log c max ) then applying this rounding procedure to the optimal primal solution to (P k ) yields a "good" solution. On the other hand, Corollary 3.4 implies that if this is not the case, then OPT(1) must be large compared to OPT, and then we observe that an α-approximation to the SWM problem trivially yields a solution with profit OPT(1)/α (Lemma 3.1). (As mentioned earlier, in the envy-free setting and unit capacities, there can be an Ω(m)-gap between the optimum profit and the optimum social welfare.) Thus, in either case we obtain the desired approximation. The algorithm is described precisely in Algorithm 1. If we use an LP-relaxation different from (P) for the SWM problem with a given valuation class that satisfies the properties stated in Remark 2.3, then the only (obvious) change to Algorithm 1 is that we now use this LP and its dual (with the appropriate capacity-vector) instead of (P) and (D) above.
Algorithm 1
Compute an optimal solution x (u) to (P u ). Use Round(u, x (u) ) to convert x (u) to a feasible allocation. 4 . Use an LP-based α-approximation algorithm for the SWM problem (with the given valuation class) to compute an α-approximate solution to the SWM problem with unit capacities, and a pricing scheme for this allocation that yields profit equal to the social-welfare value of the allocation. 5 . Return the better of the following two solutions: (1) allocation computed in step 3 with {y (u) e } as the prices; (2) allocation and pricing scheme computed in step 4.
Subadditive valuations: First, independently for each player j, assign j at most one set S by choosing set S with probability x * j,S . If an item e gets allotted to more than µ e customers this way, then arbitrarily select µ e customers from among these customers and assign e to these customers. Given item prices, this algorithm can be derandomized via the method of conditional expectations. General valuation class: Given an integrality-gap-verifying α-approximation algorithm (for (P µ )), use Lemma 2.4 to decompose x * α into a convex combination ℓ r=1 λ rx r of integer solutions to (P µ ).
(Here r λ r = 1 and λ r ≥ 0 for each r.) Returnx (r) with probability λ r . Given item prices, this algorithm can be derandomized by choosing the solution in {x (1) , . . . ,x (r) } achieving maximum profit.
Analysis. The analysis of Algorithm 1 for both subadditive valuations and a general valuation class proceeds very similarly with the only point of difference being in the analysis of the rounding procedure (Lemma 3.5). First, observe that if we have an allocation (S 1 , . . . , S n ) that is feasible with unit capacities, then since the sets S j are disjoint we can charge each customer her valuation for the assigned set by pricing one of her items at this value, and hence, obtain profit equal to the social-welfare value j v j (S j ) of the allocation. , where
) be an optimal solution to (C k ) that maximizes k T y among all optimal solutions, and opt(k) denote the optimal value. Let k 1 , . . . , k ℓ , and u be as defined in steps 1 and 2 respectively of Algorithm 1. Then, e u e y (u) e ≥ opt(c) − opt(1) / 2(1 + ǫ)H cmax . Proof. We mimic the proof in [12] . First, note that opt(k) is well-defined for all k ≥ 0.
e for all e. Let e * be an item with c e * = c max . 
This follows because, considering (y, z) = y (k j−1 ) , z (k j−1 ) , which is a feasible solution for (C k j ) and an optimal solution for (C k j−1 ), the RHS is at most e d Proof. Feasibility is immediate from Claim 2.2 since if a player j is assigned a set S then (i) for a general class of valuations, x (u) j,S > 0, and (ii) for subadditive valuations, there is some set T ⊇ S such that x (u) j,T > 0. The bound on the profit with a general valuation class follows from part (iii) of Claim 2.2 since each item e is assigned to an expected number of j,S:e∈S x (u) j,S /α players. Note that we only need the rounding property in Lemma 2.4 (and not how it is obtained). To lower-bound the profit achieved with subadditive valuations, we show that the expected number of players who are allotted an item f is at least 1 − 1 e j,S:f ∈S x (u) j,S (here, e is the base of the natural logarithm). Notice that this implies the claim since the expected profit is then at least 1 − Let X = (X j,S ) be the random, possibly infeasible solution computed after the first rounding step. Now fix an item f . To avoid clutter, we use x j and X j below as shorthand for S:f ∈S x (u) j,S and S:f ∈S X j,S respectively. Also, let g j = x j u f . The expected number of players who are allotted item f after the subsequent "cleanup" step is
Here the penultimate inequality follows from the fact that 1 − 1 − a n n is a concave function of a, and hence is Proof. By Lemmas 3.1, 3.5, and Corollary 3.4, for subadditive valuations, the profit obtained is at least max
Similarly for a general valuation class, we obtain profit at least
Remark 3.7. Note that if the allocation (S 1 , . . . , S n ) returned by Algorithm 1 is obtained via Round, then S j is always a subset of a utility-maximizing set of j, and with a general valuation class, if S j = ∅, it is a utilitymaximizing set (under the computed prices). (For submodular valuations, this implies that v j (S j ) − v j (S j \ {e}) ≥ (price of e) for all e ∈ S j .) If (S 1 , . . . , S n ) is obtained in step 4, then we may assume that v j (S j ) = max T ⊆S j v j (T ) (since we have a demand oracle for v j ); with a general valuation class, this solution can be modified to yield an approximate "one-sided envy-freeness" property. We compute (S 1 , . . . , S n ) by rounding x (1) as described in Lemma 2.4. Now choose prices {p ′ e } (arbitrarily) such that p ′ ≥ y (1) and p ′ (S j ) = max{y (1) (S j ), (1 − ǫ)v j (S j )} for every j. Since any non-empty S j is a utility-maximizing set under y (1) , it follows that (a) p ′ is a valid item-pricing yielding profit at least (1 − ǫ) j v j (S j ); (b) if S j = ∅, then the utility j derives from S j under p ′ is at least ǫ(max utility of j under p ′ ).
These properties prevent a kind of "cheating" that may occur in profit-maximization problems. To elaborate, although monotonicity of the valuation is an innocuous assumption for the SWM problem, with profit-maximization this can lead to the following artifact: a customer j desires a set A but is allotted B ⊇ A (with v j (B) = v j (A)) and items in A have 0 price and items in B \ A have positive prices, so that j ends up paying for items she never wanted! The above properties ensure that (we may assume that) the solution computed by our algorithm does not have this artifact. In fact, if j desires one of k sets A 1 , . . . , A k , then our algorithm will assign j a set S j ∈ {∅, A 1 , . . . , A k }. We could also prevent this artifact by dropping monotonicity of the valuations.
Applications
Arbitrary valuation functions. The integrality gap of (P) is known to be Θ( √ m), and there are efficient (deterministic) algorithms that verify this integrality gap [26, 23] . So Theorem 3.6 immediately yields an O( √ m log c max )-approximation algorithm for the profit-maximization problem for combinatorial auctions with arbitrary valuations.
Non-single-minded tollbooth problem on trees. In this profit-maximization problem, items are edges of a tree and customers desire paths of the tree. More precisely, let P denote the set of all paths in the tree (including ∅). Each customer j has a value v j (S) ≥ 0 for path S ∈ P, and may be assigned any (one) path of the tree. Notice that this leads to the structured valuation function v j : 2 [m] → R + where v j (T ) = max{v j (S) : S is a path in T }. Note that v j need not be subadditive. We use Algorithm 1 to obtain an O(log c max )-approximation guarantee by formulating an LP-relaxation of the SWM problem that is tailored to this setting and designing an O(1)-integrality-gap-verifying algorithm for this LP. The "new" LP is almost identical to (P), except that we now only have variables x j,S for S ∈ P. Correspondingly, in the dual (D), we only have a constraint for (j, S) when S ∈ P. Clearly, this new LP satisfies the properties stated in Remark 2.3, so parts (i) and (iii) of Claim 2.2 hold for this new LP, and so does Lemma 2.4. Thus, we only need to design an O(1)-integrality-gap-verifying algorithm for this new LP to apply Theorem 3.6. Let {v j : P → R + } j∈[n] be any instance and x * be an optimal solution to this new LP for this instance. We design a randomized algorithm that returns a (random) integer solutionx of expected objective value Ω( j,S∈P v j (S)x * j,S ). This algorithm can be derandomized using the work of [27] ; this yields an O(1)-integrality-gap-verifying algorithm for the new LP. (We have not attempted to optimize the approximation factor.) Our algorithm is a generalization of the one proposed by [9] for unsplittable flow on a line. Root the tree at an arbitrary node. Define the depth of an edge (a, b) to be the minimum of the distances of a and b to the root. Define the depth of an edge-set T to be the minimum depth of any edge in T . Let α = 0.01.
1. Independently, for every customer j, choose at most one set (i.e., path) S, by picking S with probability αx * j,S . Let S j be the set assigned to j. (If j is unassigned, then S j = ∅.) 2. Let W = ∅. Consider the sets {S j } in non-decreasing order of their depth (breaking ties arbitrarily).
For each set T = S j , if T can be added to {S i : i ∈ W } without violating any capacities, add j to W ; otherwise discard T .
Letx be the (random) integer solution computed. Using a similar argument as in [9] , we prove in Appendix A that if we select α = 0.01, then Pr[
We thus obtain the following theorem as a corollary of Theorem 3.6.
Theorem 3.8. There is an O(1)-integrality-gap-verifying algorithm (for the new LP mentioned above). This yields an O(log c max )-approximation algorithm for the non-single-minded tollbooth problem on trees.
We remark that since the above algorithm satisfies the rounding property in Lemma 2.4, we can directly use it to round x (u) (more efficiently) to a feasible allocation in step 3 of Algorithm 1, instead of using the Carr-Vempala decomposition procedure (which relies on the ellipsoid method).
Refinement for the non-single-minded highway problem
In this section, we describe a different approach that does not use OPT SWM as an upper bound on the optimum profit. Instead our approach is based on using an exponential-size configuration LP to decompose the original instance into various smaller (and easier) instances. We use this to obtain an O(log m)-approximation for the non-single-minded (non-SM) highway problem (recall that this is the tollbooth problem on a path, so customers desire intervals) with subadditive valuations, and arbitrary valuations but unlimited supply (Theorem 1.2). Note that this is incomparable to the O(log n)-approximation obtained earlier for the tollbooth problem on trees (as c max ≤ n); the number of distinct sets is O(m 2 ) but the number of customers can be much larger (or smaller). Also, an O(log m)-approximation is impossible to obtain using the approach in Section 3, and in general any approach that uses the optimum of the (integer or fractional) SWM problem as an upper bound, because, as mentioned earlier, there is a simple example with just one item and c max = n, where the SWM-optimum is an H cmax -factor away from the optimum profit. Let P be the set of all intervals on the line (with m edges). As with the non-SM tollbooth problem on trees (in Section 3.1), each customer j has a value for each subpath (which is now an interval). So we view v j as a function v j : P → R + , and subadditivity means that for any two intervals A, B, where A ∪ B is also an interval, we have
We outline the proof of Theorem 1.2. First, we use a simple procedure (Proposition 4.1) to partition the intervals into O(log m) disjoint sets, where each set is a union of item-disjoint "cliques". Here, a clique is a set of paths that share a common edge; two cliques P 1 and P 2 are item-disjoint, if A ∩ B = ∅ for all A ∈ P 1 , B ∈ P 2 . Proposition 4.1 (see [7] ). A set of k intervals on the line can be partitioned into at most ⌊log(k + 1)⌋ sets, each of which is a union of item-disjoint cliques.
Thus, we can decompose P into O(log m) sets; to get an O(log m)-approximation algorithm, it suffices to give an O(1)-approximation algorithm when the intervals form a union of item-disjoint cliques. It is unclear how to achieve a near-optimal solution even in this structured setting, as there are various dependencies between the cliques in a set: a customer can only be assigned an interval in one of the cliques. We solve this "union-of-cliques" pricing problem as follows. We first trim each clique P i in our set randomly to a one-sided half-clique by (essentially) ignoring the items to the left or right of the common edge of P i . The details of this truncation are slightly different depending on whether we have subadditive or arbitrary valuations (see the proof of Lemma 4.2), but a key observation is that, in expectation, we only lose a factor of 2 by this truncation. We formulate an LP-relaxation for the pricing problem involving these half-cliques. Solving this LP requires the ellipsoid method, where the separation oracle is provided by the solution to another (easier) pricing problem, where the (half) cliques are now decoupled. We devise an algorithm based on dynamic programming (DP) to compute a near-optimal solution to this pricing problem, which then yields a near-optimal solution to the LP (Lemma 4.3) . Finally, we argue that this near-optimal fractional solution can be rounded to an integer solution losing only an O(1)-factor (Lemma 4.4). Combining the various ingredients, we obtain the desired O(1)-approximation for the "union-of-cliques" pricing problem, which in turn yields an O(log m)-approximation for our original non-single-minded highway problem.
We assume in the following that the edges of the line are numbered 1, 2, . . . , m, from left to right. Proof. Let A = i P i be a set of intervals where the P i s are item-disjoint cliques. Let e i denote the common edge of P i , and ℓ i and r i be the leftmost and rightmost edge used by some interval of P i . We first trim the cliques to one-sided half-cliques. For every clique P i independently, we discard one of the "halves" of P i with probability 1/2. More precisely, for subadditive valuations, discarding the right half means that we truncate each interval S ∈ P i to S ∩ [ℓ i , e i ] to obtain the half-clique H i of truncated intervals; when discarding the left half we set H i = {S ∩ [e i + 1, r i ] : S ∈ P i }. For arbitrary valuations with unlimited supply, discarding the right half is defined to simulate the effect of pricing all edges in [e i + 1, r i ] at 0 (discarding the left half is symmetric). So in this case, we define the half-clique H i to be {S ∪ [e i + 1, r i ] : S ∈ P i } (note that there are no capacity constraints).
A key observation is that for both subadditive and arbitrary valuations, E opt(H i ) ≥ opt(P i )/2 for every i, where opt(S) denotes the optimum profit when players may only be assigned intervals from S.
We now consider the problem of setting interval prices for the intervals in i H i that of course obey the constraint that p(S) ≤ p(T ) if S ⊆ T . First, we discretize the space of interval prices. Let B be the maximum price any player may pay in a feasible solution. We consider only positive prices of the form d q = B/2 q , q ∈ Z ≥0 for d q ≥ B/mn. We lose at most a factor of 2(1 + 1 m ) this way (since we have itemdisjoint half-cliques). Now we have O(log n + log m) different prices. Let R i denote the set of all possible solutions for H i , where a solution specifies a pricing of the intervals in H i (choosing non-zero prices from {d q } or 0) and an allocation of intervals to customers satisfying the budget and capacity constraints. We introduce a variable y jp ≥ 0 for each customer j and price p denoting if customer j buys a path at price p, and a variable x i,R for each R ∈ R i denoting whether solution R has been chosen for H i . Let p j (R) be the price that j pays under the solution R, and R i,j,p = R ∈ H i : p j (R) = p be the set of solutions for H i where j pays price p. We consider the following LP. Here p indexes all the possible interval-prices.
x i,R , y jp ≥ 0 for all i, R, j, p.
Constraint (4) ensures that a customer only buys at at most one price, and constraint (5) ensures that j can only buy at price p if a solution R ∈ i R i,j,p has been selected. The arguments above establish that OPT (P2) is at least 1/4 1+ 1 m -fraction of the optimum for the instance A (for both subadditive and arbitrary valuations). We show that one can obtain an integer solution to (P2) of objective value at least OPT (P2) /4; this will complete the proof.
(P2) has an exponential number of variables, so to solve it we consider the dual problem. The separation oracle for the dual amounts to solving a related pricing problem where the half-cliques are now decoupled. We give a 2-approximation algorithm for this problem, which then yields a 2-approximate dual solution, and hence, a 2-approximate solution to (P2) (Lemma 4.3). Lemma 4.4 states that this fractional solution can then be rounded to an integer solution losing at most another factor of 2. This completes the proof. Proof. We first show how to get a 2-approximate solution for the dual problem. This will also yield a method to get a 2-approximate primal solution. Consider the dual program:
Note that (D2) has an exponential number of constraints. In order to solve (D2) efficiently, we use the ellipsoid method, which reduces the problem of solving the LP to finding a separation oracle that, given a candidate solution vector v = (α, β, γ), either produces a feasible solution (usually the input v) or returns a constraint violated by v. Constraints (6) and (8) can easily be checked in polynomial time. In the following, we will therefore assume that v satisfies these constraints. On the other hand, there are an exponential number of constraints (7) . It turns out that checking whether one of these constraints is violated amounts to solving a generalized non-single-minded pricing instance: we seek to find a solution R ∈ R i , such that j,p:R∈R i,j,p γ jp is maximized, i.e., a customer j who is allotted an interval priced at p contributes γ jp to the objective value. If the maximum achievable profit on some half-clique H i is larger than α i , then the corresponding solution yields a violated constraint. Otherwise all constraints are satisfied. Although it seems that we have not gained much by reducing the original non-single-minded pricing problem to another even more generalized pricing problem, the crucial point here is that we have removed the dependencies between different (half) cliques. Instead of solving this problem with the given γ, we move to a slightly more structuredṽ = (α, β,γ) to be specified shortly, such that ifṽ violates a constraint, then the same constraint is also violated by v. Note also thatṽ and v have the same objective function value since they share the same α and β values. We defineγ jp := max{0, p − β j }. Note that γ ≥γ since we have assumed that v satisfies the constraints (6) and (8) . Hence, ifṽ violates one of the constraints (7), v also violates it.
We give a 2-approximation algorithm for this new pricing problem on a half-clique, which we call the voucher-pricing problem. (The rationale is that β j can be viewed as a voucher that customer j can redeem and thereby decrease her price). We describe the algorithm shortly, but first we show that this implies the lemma. Using this approximation algorithm for the separation oracle yields a dual solution (α, β, γ) that is potentially not feasible. In particular, it could violate the constraints (7), however only by a factor of at most 2. By scaling α accordingly, we get a feasible solution (2α, β, γ) whose objective function value is at most 2 · OPT (D2) .
Now applying an argument similar to the one used by Jain et al. [22] shows that one can also compute a 2-approximate primal solution.
A 2-approximation algorithm for the voucher-pricing problem on a half-clique H i . The algorithm follows the dynamic-programming approach by Aggarwal et al. [1] . The main observation is that if we relax the constraint that a customer buys (i.e., is assigned) at most one interval and only prevent her from buying two intervals at the same price then we lose at most a factor of 2. To see this, note that since we have discretized our search space of prices, if p is the maximum price paid by a customer j in a solution to the relaxed problem (where she can buy multiple intervals), then j's contribution to the profit is at most
and if we assign j only the single interval at price p (note that this still satisfies the capacity constraints), we get profit max{p − β j , 0}. We solve this relaxed problem using dynamic programming. To keep notation simple, let T 1 ⊇ T 2 ⊇ . . . ⊇ T ℓ denote the intervals in H i . So we require that p(T 1 ) ≥ . . . ≥ p(T ℓ ). Let d Q be the lowest non-zero price in our discrete price-space, and let d Q+1 := 0.
Let F (q, i, U ) denote the value of an optimal solution when customers are only assigned intervals from from {T i , . . . , T ℓ }, the prices of these intervals lie in {d q , . . . , d Q , d Q+1 }, and U customers have been assigned intervals from {T 1 , . . . , T i−1 } (recall that a customer may be assigned multiple intervals if they are priced differently). Clearly F (0, 1, 0) is the optimal value we are looking for. The base cases are easy: we set F (Q + 1, i, U ) = 0 for all i, U . For k ≥ i, let C(i, k, q) denote the set of customers who can afford to buy an interval in {T i , . . . , T k } priced at d q . Set C(i, k, q) = ∅ for k < i.
Suppose we decide to set the price of intervals T i , . . . , T k to p = d q and assign t customers to these intervals. Then, the best value that one can earn from intervals {T k+1 , . . . , T ℓ } is F (q + 1, k + 1, U + t). Notice that this does not depend on which t customers are assigned intervals in T i , . . . , T k or how these customers are allotted these intervals. Thus, we can compute the optimum assignment of intervals in T i , . . . , T k to t customers separately. This is an interval packing problem which one can solve efficiently.
For j ∈ C(i, k, q), let i j be the largest index i ′ ∈ {i, . . . , k} such that j can afford to buy T i ′ at price p = d q . Notice that we may assume that in an optimal solution to this interval packing solution, if j is assigned an interval, it is assigned T i j . Now we can formulate the following integer program for solving this interval packing problem. For each j ∈ C(i, k, q), let Z j be an indicator variable that denotes if j is assigned interval T i j . Then, we want to solve the following integer program. max j∈C(i,k,q) Z j max{d q − β j , 0} s.t. j Z j = t, j:e∈T i j Z j ≤ c e − U ∀e, Z j ∈ {0, 1} ∀j.
It is well known that an interval packing problem can be solved efficiently (e.g., by finding an optimal solution to its LP-relaxation). Let P (i, k, q, t) be the optimal value of the above program, and −∞ if the program is infeasible. Then we have the following recurrence.
F (q, i, U ) = max F (q + 1, k + 1, U + t) + P (i, k, q, t) : i − 1 ≤ k ≤ ℓ, 0 ≤ t ≤ n .
We need to compute O (log m + log n)ℓn table entries for F (·, ·, ·) to get the optimal value, and so this DP can be implemented in polynomial time. Note that we can easily record the corresponding solution along with the computation of each F (q, i, U ). Proof. Let (x, y) denote a feasible solution to (P2). Recall that p j (R) is the price j pays in the solution R. For each j and each solution R ∈ i R i we can define values y ij,R such that y ij,R ≤ x i,R for all i, j, R ∈ R i , and y jp = i,R∈R i,j,p y ij,R for all j, p. By making "clones" of a solution R ∈ R i if necessary, we can ensure that y ij,R is either 0 or x i,R for every R ∈ R i . The rounding is simple: independently, for each half-clique H i , we choose solution R ∈ R i with probability x i,R . Let Q i denote the solution selected for H i . Now we assign each customer j to the H i with maximum p j (Q i ). Notice that this yields a feasible solution for the instance composed of the union of the (half) cliques. The analysis is quite similar to the analysis in [14] and [1] ; we reproduce it here for completeness. y ij,R . Note that i Z ij θ i = i R∈R i y ij,R p j (R) = p py jp . Consider the sub-optimal way of assigning j to a (random) R, where we assign j to the H i with maximum Z ij for which y ij,Q i > 0; if there is no such i then j is unassigned. Let k be the number of half-cliques, and let these be ordered so that Z 1j ≥ Z 2j ≥ . . . Z kj . The expected price that j pays under this suboptimal assignment is
which following the analysis in [14] (for example) is at least 1 − 1 e i Z ij θ i = 1 − 1 e j,p py jp . Thus, the expected profit obtained is at least (1 − e −1 ) p py jp . The algorithm can be derandomized using a simple pipage rounding argument.
Proof of Corollary 1.3. As we mentioned in the introduction, the Max-Buy multi-product pricing problem can be viewed as a non-SM highway problem, where there are m disjoint edges and each bidder has values only on theses edges. As we did in the proof of Lemma 4.2, we write an LP of the form (P2), except that we do not have to round the prices (note that the number of relevant positive prices on each edge is at most the number of customer valuations on that edge). Then following the approach we used in the proof of Lemma 4.4, we can solve the dual problem (D2) in polynomial time since a separation oracle reduces to the voucher pricing problem on a single item which can be trivially solved in polynomial time.
The claim then follows immediately by combining this with the rounding procedure of Lemma 4.4.
